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In April, Papua New Guinea’s (PNG’s) Registrar of 
Political Parties, Dr Alphonse Gelu, suggested that 
current political stability points to ‘the emergence of 
a new political culture’ changing the face of politics 
for the better (Kenneth 17/4/15, 2).
It’s tempting to dismiss that comment as political 
puff; Gelu wasn’t speaking as a scholar but as an official 
supporting a Bill to reinvigorate the Organic Law on 
the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (OLIP-
PAC). Many familiar features of PNG politics clearly 
remain. But, given Gelu’s expertise, and the strange 
mix of sure-footed and wobbly moves by Prime Minis-
ter Peter O’Neill’s government since the 2012 election, 
it’s worth giving the proposition serious consideration.
PNG’s most distinct change in political culture un- 
folded after 1982, following the country’s second 
national election since independence (Standish 2013, 
8). Up until then, political parties’ regional identities, 
policy differences, loyalty, and voter-identification  
with leaders had remained reasonably strong. By the  
early–mid 1980s, however, national politics was in-
creasingly focused on gaining and allocating the spoils 
of office. Politicians’ use of cash and promises of sup-
port to buy votes may have increased connections 
between leaders and some constituents, but, nationally, 
made the executive ever less accountable to parliament 
and parliament less responsive to the population.
Key causes of PNG’s shift toward localism and  
patronage included social fragmentation; the abstract 
nature of notions of state, nation, and ideology com-
pared to other calls on peoples’ identity and allegiances; 
traditional leadership styles; the limited spread of 
the formal economy outside the resource sector; the 
country’s brief and shallow colonial experience; the 
collapse of state services; non-emergence of issue-
based political parties; and the expectations and  
demands of citizens themselves (Allen & Hasnain 2010).
At one level, PNG’s political culture has seemed 
pretty resilient since then. It’s easy to trace continui-
ties in the to-and-fro between measures to restore a 
more nationally focused, Westminster-type, approach 
versus unplanned actions and deliberate policies that 
have deepened PNG’s acutely clientelistic political 
style. Introduction of the OLIPPAC in 2001 to reduce 
MPs’ party-hopping, and limited preferential voting 
from 2003, have had limited efficacy. Other attempted 
reforms have had mixed or opposite effects to those 
intended. The introduction of initially small discre-
tionary funds in 1984 to increase MPs’ relevance in 
their electorates, 1995 reforms that put national MPs 
in charge of the provinces as governors, and the 2013 
extension of the grace period from parliamentary 
votes of no confidence to 42 months of a five-year 
term, all reinforced the incidence of huge government 
coalitions facing tiny oppositions, for example. Gov-
ernment ploys such as lengthy adjournments of parlia-
ment, misusing the parliamentary speaker’s role, and 
reallocating lucrative portfolios to wavering ministers 
have become common too. It’s tempting, then, to sug-
gest there’s nothing new under PNG’s political sun.
Yet it’s also difficult to escape a sense there’s 
something stirring beyond just the acceleration and 
intensification of usual pressures. While it may not 
comprise a wholesale transformation, there are signs 
of a shift from the still fairly cautious accommoda-
tion of the reality of money politics toward embrac-
ing and harnessing its logic to try to deliver ‘stabil-
ity’ (control) in Waigani and services to some of the 
rural majority — at least to those in successful can-
didates’ voter strongholds and target communities. 
That’s born of a decade of economic growth, plus 
O’Neill’s distinctive aims and approach.
In electoral terms, political gifting is now ‘evident 
in parts of PNG where there are no “big men” and 
where cultures of competitive exchange are largely 
absent’ (Haley 2014, 1). More significantly, O’Neill 
introduced legislation in November 2013 to bring 
all teachers, police, health workers, and other public 
servants in each district under authorities chaired 
by their MPs —  giving politicians greater influence 
over appointments and spending (Wiltshire 13/1/14). 
Provinces and districts have received larger devolved 
District Services Improvement Program funds and 
other discretionary development project funds in 
consecutive budgets since 2008 (PGK10 million per 
district by 2013) despite lacking the administrative 
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structures to effectively purchase new classrooms, 
aid posts or roads or acquit that spending properly. 
Total discretionary funding had reached PGK1.5 
billion each year — 12 per cent of the budget, and 
more than any single department — two years ago, 
and has grown since then.
Paradoxically, this radical decentralisation in 
administrative terms drastically centralises power in 
political terms. The response to the weak capacity 
of mainstream public service departments in Port 
Moresby and administrators in the provinces to ful-
fil Waigani’s direction or the needs of rural people 
for service delivery is further eroding those agen-
cies’ capacity by appropriating their allocations and 
responsibilities. True, there aren’t many effective 
levers to erode outside a few provinces such as East 
New Britain or organisations such as the Education 
Department. And at least more funds spent impru-
dently outside Port Moresby may trickle down to 
some rural communities than those spent unwisely 
in the capital. But devolving spending further politi-
cises development decisions at the local level, while 
concentrating power in the hands of an executive 
frequently accused of withholding funds from its 
adversaries at the national level.
O’Neill ‘rationalised his parliamentary major-
ity into a political philosophy’ during the 2011–12 
constitutional crisis known as ‘the impasse’ and 
hasn’t entirely discarded that stance since then 
(May forthcoming). He’s also preserved PNG’s stat-
ist model of development, despite devolving spend-
ing. He and former prime ministers will be trustees 
of the ‘Kumul’ consolidated portfolio of state-
owned assets, while his government has borrowed 
to acquire equity in major projects that might be 
better left in private hands if effectively taxed.
Meanwhile, there are signs the absence of a 
strong parliamentary opposition is spurring others  
to try to hold the executive to account. It’s less clear, 
though, that such actors always assist the sort of 
stability Gelu predicts. Online civil-society voices 
seeking to fill the gap can be reckless as well as prin-
cipled, while the courts, ombudsman, and admin-
istrators in place to prevent misconduct by leaders 
have been accused — especially by those being inves-
tigated — of bias and overreach. The institutionalisa-
tion of money politics could also intensify political 
competition already elevated by strong economic 
headwinds, over two per cent population growth, 
rapid urbanisation, and social change. As neighbour-
ing Solomon Islands shows, the sky’s the limit for 
how much of a national budget MPs can spend once 
a patrimonial model becomes entrenched.
That might be financially sustainable given PNG’s  
resource endowment. And the country’s medium-
term economic trajectory appears brighter than at 
many points in the last four decades, despite the 
looming short-term crunch. Yet it’s unclear whether a 
polity deliberately built around money politics would 
be politically sustainable under a future leader lacking 
O’Neill’s guile and steely resolve.
If he or another prime minister can ride that 
political tiger until oil prices recover and resource 
construction recommences, all may still be well. But 
a sustained decline in growth and stability would 
have serious security, diplomatic, and aid policy 
implications for Australia, as well as for PNG.
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